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THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE
NEW DEAL*
FORREST REvERE BLAcK
Students of constitutional law recognize that almost from the be-
ginning of the government there has been a gradual expansion of the
commerce clause. John Marshall only participated in three commerce
clause decisions' but he bequeathed to succeeding generations of
jurists four perplexing problems: the intricacies of the "original pack-
.age" doctrine, the proper inferences to be drawn from Congressional
silence, the nature and scope of the plenary concept and the query
whether Congressional power was immediately exclusive. Since Mar-
shall's day, more than eight hundred cases involving the commerce
clause have been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States,2
and with the growing complexity and interdependence of the various
units in our national business structure, a sort of manifest destiny has
justified a continuifig expansion of the commerce clause.
The present Administration came into power "confronted with an
emergency more serious than war" and convinced that "there must
be power in the states and the nation to remould, through experi-
mentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing
social and economic needs". 4 If the Administration was to act with
courage and effectiveness, it was forced to utilize the commerce clause,
for the very good reason that no other constitutional sanction was
available5 for such basic acts as the N.I.R.A. and the A.A.A. A more
*Address before American Political Science Association, Chicago, December
27, 1934.
1Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. i, 6 L. ed. 23 (1824); Brown v. Maryland, 12
Wheat. 419, 6 L. ed. 678 (1827); Wilson v. The Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2
Pet. 245, 7 L. ed. 412 (I829). He participated in the consideration of the case of
Mayor of the City of New York v. Miln, i Pet. 1o2, 9 L. ed. 648 (1837) but died
before the case was decided. See GAviT, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE (1932) 10.
2See GAvIT, op. cit. supra note i, Appendix A, at 387-530.
3Brandeis' dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U. S. 262, 36, 52
Sup. Ct. 371, 385 (1931).
4Id. at 311, Sup. Ct. at 386.
5Some of the supporters of the Recovery Act professed to find constitutional
authority in (i) the preamble; (2) general welfare and (3) the commerce clause.
(See Report of Ways and Means Comm., H. R. REP. No. 159, 73rd Cong. ist
Sess. at p. 2). But it is well settled that the preamble is not a source of power.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, i97 U. S. I, 49 L. ed. 639. (igo5); STORY, CoMbEN-
T6o
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timid government would have been nonplussed. The stragetists be-
hind the New Deal believed with Justice Brandeis6 that "if we would
guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold".
Our most distinguished Prophet of Doom 7 has reminded us "that in
view of the precedents, the Supreme Court will have to swallow the
largest dish of crow that any court ever swallowed to uphold the New
Deal." In order that we may visualize the elastic interpretation that
has been given the commerce clause by the present Administration,
let us by way of contrast refer to the well known statement by Mr.
Justice Lamar in Kidd v. Pearsons-a case that is cherished by critics
of the New Deal.
"Manufacturing is transformation-the fashioning of raw ma-
terials into a change of form for use. The functions of commerce
are different... If it be held that the term (commerce) includes
the regulation of all such manufactures as are intended to be
the subject of commercial transactions in the future, it is im-
possible to deny that it would also include all productive indus-
tries that contemplate the same thing. The result would be that
Congress would be invested, to the exclusion of the states, with
the power to regulate, not only manufacture, but also agriculture,
horticulture, stock raising, domestic fisheries, mining ;-in short,
every branch of human industry. For is there one of them that
does not contemplate, more or less clearly, an interstate or for-
eign market? Does not the wheat grower of the Northwest, and
the cotton planter of the South, plant, cultivate and harvest his
crop with an eye on the prices at Liverpool, New York and
Chicago?"
Although this statement was uttered in a case involving state power,
we assume that it is unnecessary to labor the point that the New Deal
conception of the commerce clause is a far cry from the above quoted
doctrine of the vintage of 1888 endorsed by a unanimous Supreme
Court.
TARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION (5th ed. 195o) §462; Tucker, The General Welfare
(1921) 8 Va. L. Rev. x67, 170. So the General Welfare clause in Art. I, Section 8
is not a substantive grant of power, but rather a statement of the purposes for
which money may be appropriated. I WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1929) §61; Corwin, The Spending Power of Congress (1923)
36 HARV. L. REV. 548, 550-552.
6Supra note 3, at 311, Sup. Ct. at 386.
7Hon. James M. Beck, speaking on the floor of the House of Representatives.
77 CONG. REC. 4388, May 26, 1933. So many and so varied are the theories that
have been advanced to support the New Deal that one judge said contemptuously
that "no one has yet had the temerity to suggest that the original package doc-
trine will justify them." United States v. Suburban Motor Service Corp. 5 F.
Supp. 798 (D. C. Ill. 1934).
8128 U. S. I, 32 L. ed. 346 (1888).
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It shall be our purpose to indicate generally the chief techniques
and the more significant constitutional theories utilized by the govern-
ment in its attempt to justify the validity of this new legislation under
the commerce clause. Because of the complexity and the ramifications
of our problem, we are constrained to a general discussion of the New
Deal legislation under the commerce clause rather than a specific
defense of separate statutes.
(i) A realistic jurisprudence insists that it is a question of economics
whether a certain activity is subject to the commerce clause.
The term commerce is not a "word of art" having a precise and
static content to be determined in vacuo. As we have become better
acquainted with the nature of the judicial process the significance of
social and economic interpretations of the due process clause has be-
come accepted in our legal thinking. The authors of the New Deal in-
sist that any constitutional opinion as to the scope of the commerce
clause in a particular situation, must run the gauntlet of an economic
justification on the basis of the factual background. 0
Congress in passing the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the
National Industrial Recovery Act incorporated into the statutes" a
Declaration of Emergency and a Declaration of Policy that make
articulate the vital connection between the economic depression in
agriculture and business and the commerce clause. These declaratio n
OCushman, Social and Economic Interpretation of the 14th Amendment (1922) 20
MicHi.L. REv. 737.
'
0 As an illustration of a regular practice in the A.A.A., attention is called to a
memorandum addressed to all A.A.A. Economists concerning economic data in
support of marketing agreements, licenses and codes under date of March 7, 1934
issued by Jerome N. Frank, General Counsel. One excerpt reads: "Economists
working on agreements and licenses are, therefore, urged to fully state all the
facts bearing on the reasonableness or unreasonableness of licenses and agree-
ments, so that the lawyers, in giving their opinions prior to the execution of agree-
ment and the issuance of a license, may predicate their judgment as to enforce-
ability on as full a knowledge of the facts as it is possible to obtain." See Bikle,
Judicial Determination of Questions of fact affecting the Constitutional Validity of
Legislative Action (1924) HARV. L. REv. 6.
"The Declaration of Policy of the N.I.R.A. declares, "A national emergency,
productive of widespread unemployment and disorganization of industry, which
burdens interstate and foreign commerce P. . . is hereby declared to exist." The
Declaration of Emergency in the A.A.A. reads, "That the present acute economic
emergency being in part the consequence of a severe and increasing disparity
between the prices of agricultural and other commodities, which disparity has
largely destroyed the purchasing power of farmers for industrial products, has
broken down the orderly exchange of commodities . . . it is hereby declared that
these conditions in the basic industry of agriculture . . . have burdened and
obstructed the normal currents of commerce in such commodities, and render
imperative the immediate enactment of Title i of this Act."
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follow the enacting clause and are an integral part of the statute.
Nothing is left to conjecture or implication. This change in legislative
technique affords a much more effective device than the old-fashioned
preamble. 2
(2) Where a factual declaration of emergency is incorporated into an
act there is strong contemporaneous authority to the effect that the Supreme
Court of the United States will accord every possible presumption in favor
of the correctness of the legislative declaration.
In Block v. Hirsch,3 the Congressional act regulating rents in the
District of Columbia contained a factual declaration of emergency.
Mr. Justice Holmes speaking for the court said,
"A declaration by a legislature concerning public conditions
that by necessity and duty it must know, is entitled- at least to
great respect. In this instance Congress stated a publicly notor-
ious and almost world-wide fact: That the energency declared by
the statute did exist must be assumed. .. "
In Nebbia v. People of the State14 of New York, the New York Legis-
lature incorpoAted a declaration of emergency into the Agricultural
and Markets Act setting forth the reasons for the enactment. The
court declared,
"Times without number we have said that the Legislature is
primarily the judge 'of the necessity of such an enactment, that
every possible presumption is in favor of its validity, and that
though the court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of
the law, it may not be annulled unless palpably in excess of legis-
lative power. See McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 547, 29 S.
Ct. 2o6, 53 L. Ed. 315; Tanner v. Little, 240 U. S. 369, 385, 36 S.
Ct. 379, 6o L. Ed. 691; Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233, 240, 40
S. Ct. 499, 64 L. Ed. 878; O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Ins.
Co., 282 U. S. 251, 257,258, 51 S. Ct. 130, 75 L.Ed: 3 24 , 72A.L.R.
1163; Gant v. Oklahoma City, 289 U. S. 98, 102, 53 S. Ct. 530, 77L. Ed . 1058".
In the Minnesota Moratorium Act, the Minnesota legislature util-
ized a declaration of emergency in the first section of the Act. The
Supreme Court of the United States held this legislation valid in
Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell,5 the court said,
"The declarations of the existence of this emergency by the
legislature and by the Supreme Court of Minnesota cannot be re-
12Preambles are not, properly speaking parts of acts. They do not exproprio
vigore make the law and in themselves have no constraining force upon the citizen.
(BLACK, INTERPRETATION OF LAWS 254).
13256 U. S. 526,41 Sup. Ct. 458 (1920).
1428I U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505 (1933).
15290 U.S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct. 231 (1933).
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garded as a subterfuge or as lacking in adequate basis... The
economic emergency which threatened the loss of homes and
lands which furnished those in possession the necessary shelter
and means of subsistence was a potent cause for the enactment
of the statute."
(3) The doctrine of Judicial Notice.
Even in the absence of a specific declaration of factual background
incorporated into the act, the Supreme Court under the doctrine of
judicial notice has not only recognized the existence of the present
emergency "which dominates contemporary thought"'16 but also the
vital connection between the economic depression and the commerce
clause. In Appalachian Coals Inc. v. United States'7 the court declared,
"The interests of producers and consumers are interlinked.
When industry is greviously hurt, when producing concerns fail,
when unemployment mounts and communities dependent upon
profitable production are prostrate, the wells of commerce go
dry".
Further the court may take judicial notice of economic and statistical
data contained in official publications which tend to support the
government's theory that there is a vital connection between recovery
legislation and the commerce clause.'8
(4) The legal effect of the emergency.
The government does not contend that Congress has an "emerg-
ency" power over commerce in the sense that constitutional limita-
tions are suspended or that by virtue of the emergency that the federal
government has a true police power. The only effect of an "emerg-
ency", in the sense that the economic depression is an emergency, is
that it presents a situation in which interstate commerce is endan-
gered by -activities which in normal times would not seriously affect it.,
Congress can then reach out and control those activities under its
commerce power because of their effect on interstate commerce, and for
no othdr reason.
16Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. R. v. United States, 284 U. S. 248, 52 Sup.
Ct. 146 (1932).
17288 U. S. 344, 372, 53 Sup. Ct. 471, 478 (1932).
'
8Jackson v. United States, 230 U.S. I, 33 Sup. Ct. 1l1 (1912); Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324 (907). A typical illustration of such an
official publication is the official government publication: EZEKIEL AND BEAN,
EcoNoMIc BASES FOR THE AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT (1933).
'
9As an example consider the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The statute recites
that the national flow of interstate commerce has fallen to an alarmingly low
level due to a disparity between the prices of agricultural and other products,
which disparity has been caused in part by the existence of ruinous surpluses. The
Act provides a means for increasing the purchasing power of the farmer and
thereby increasing the flow of interstate commerce.
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"Although an emergency may not call into life a power which
has never lived, nevertheless emergency may afford a reason for
the exertion of a living power already enjoyed". 20
As the court declared in In Re Debs,21
"Constitutional provisions do not change, but their operation
extends to new matters as the modes of business and the habits
of life of the people vary with each succeeding generation".
(5) Whether the economic reasoning behind the legislation is sound or
unsound is not open to judicial inquiry.
In Stafford v. Wallace2 the Supreme Court said:
"Whatever amounts to more or less constant practice and
threatens to obstruct or unduly to burden the freedom of inter-
state commerce is within the kegulatory power of Congress under
the commerce clause, and it is primarily for Congress to consider
and decide the fact of the danger and meet it. This Court will cer-
tainly not substitute its judgment for that of Congress in such a mat-
ter, unless the relation of the subject to interstate commerce and its
effect upon it are clearly nonexistent." (Underscoring supplied)
At the time of the adoption of the Anti-Trust Laws, it was the
opinion of Congress that free and unrestricted competition was a wise
and wholesome situation for all commerce, and that the national
prosperity required that such free competition be maintained. The
Courts did not then inquire into the soundness of the economic theory
thus adopted by Congress but upheld the Anti-Trust Laws as a proper
exercise of the commerce power. Thus, in Northern Securities Co. v.
U. S.,23 the Court said:
"Whether the free operatioof the normal laws of competition is a
wise and wholesome rule for trade and commerce is an economic
question which this court need not consider or determine. Undoubted-
ly, there are those who think that the general business interests and
prosperity of the country will be best promoted if the rule of competi-
tion is not applied. But there ate others who believe that such a
rule is more necessary in these days of enormous wealth than it
ever was in any former period of our history. Be all this as it may,
Congress has, in effect, recognized the rule of free competition by
declaring illegal every combination or conspiracy in restraint of
interstate and international commerce. As in the judgment of
Congress the public convenience and the general welfare will be
best subserved when the natural laws of competition are left un-
disturbed by those engaged in interstate commerce, and as Con-
gress has embodied that rule in a statute, that must be, for all, the
2OWilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298 (1917).
21158 U. S. 564, 591, 15 Sup. Ct. 900 (1894).
258 U. S. 495, 521, 42 Sup. Ct. 397 (1921).
23,93 U. S. 197, 337, 24 Sup. Ct. 436 (19o3).
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end of the matter, if this is to remain a government of laws, and
not of men." (Underscoring supplied.)
Congress has now found that the forces of free competition are, if
unrestricted, not in the interest of the national prosperity, but it is not
for the court to pass on the wisdom of the economic philosophy under-
lying the New Deal.
The discussion thus far has been general and by way of background.
It remains to consider certain well-established commerce clause doc-
trines and the cumulative effect of their application under emergency
conditions. A new concept of commerce power emerges.
(6) The commerce clause is not limited to the regulation of the move-
ment of commodities or persons or information across state lines, but ex-
tends to the regulation of intrastate activities whenever such regulation is
necessary for the effective control of interstate activity.
Situation (i), where intrastate commerce is intermingled with inter-
state commerce (over which Congress exercises it§ regulatory power)
to such an extent that the effective regulation of the latter requires
regulation of the former. In United States v. New York Central R. R.14
which held the recapture clause valid though it reduced income from
intrastate as well as interstate rates, the court said,
"Where, as here, interstate and intrastate transactions are in-
terwoven, the regulation of the latter is so incidental to and in-
separable from the regulation of the former as properly to be
deemed included in the authority over interstate commerce".
In the Minnesota Rate Cases,25 the Supreme Court, in discussing the
power of the Federal Government to fix intrastate railroad rates, said:
"There is no room in our scheme of government for the asser-
tion of state power in hostility to the authorized exercise of Fed-
eral power. The authority of Congress extends to every part of
interstate commerce, and to every instrumentality or agency by
which it is carried on; and the full control by Congress of the subject
committed to its regulation is not to be denied or thwarted by the com-
mingling of interstate and intrastate operations. This is not to say
that the Nation may deal with the internal concerns of the State,
as such, but that the execution by Congress of its constitutional
power to regulate interstate commerce is not limited by the fact that in-
trastate transactions may have become so interwoven therewith that the
effective government of theformerincidentally controls the latter. This
conclusionnecessarilyresults from the supremacy of the national
power within its appointed sphere." (Underscoring supplied.)
21272 U. S. 457, 464, 47 Sup. Ct. 130 (1926); To like effect: Southern Railway
Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20, 32 Sup. Ct. 2 (I9r I) (Safety Appliances);
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194, 32
Sup. Ct. 436 (191i) (System of Accounts).
25230 U. S. 352,399, 33 Sup. Ct. 729 (1912).
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Situation (2), where the regulation of interstate commerce alone
would give to intrastate commerce of the same character an unfair
competitive advantage.
In the Houston East & West Texas Railway Co. v. United States,2"
the Supreme Court sustained the power of the Interstate Commerce
Commission to fix intrastate rates where it was shown that, unless
such power was sustained, interstate shippers would be forced to pay
rates disproportionately high as compared with the rates paid by in-
trastate shippers. In so holding, the Supreme Court said:
27
"The power to deal with the relation between the two kinds of
rates, as a relation, lies exclusively with Congress... It is imma-
terial, so far as the protecting power of Congress is concerned,
that the discrimination arises from. intrastste rates as compared
with interstate rates... Wherever the interstate and intrastate
transactions of carriers are so related that the government of the
one involves the control of the other, it is Congress and not the
State, that is entitled to prescribe the final and dominant rule, for
otherwise Congress would be denied the exercise of its constitu-
tional authority and the State, and not the Nation, would be
supreme within the national field." (Underscoring supplied.)28
Situation (3), where intrastate commerce affects or burdens interstate
commerce. The depression has emphasized that the business of the
nation has become a single integrated whole. The prosperity of each
basic industry is dependent on every other industry. Before the na-
tion became an economic unit, commercial activities in one state con-
cerned other states only through actual movements of goods across
state lines. But by virtue of the unity of our present national business
structure, emphasis now is placed not on movement, but on the fact
that business in one state does affect business in other states.
29
The effort under the New Deal to fix prices, control output, regulate
wages and hours, relieve unemployment, define trade practices and
increase purchasing power has for its chief object the increasing of the
flow of interstate commerce which had reached an alarmingly low
level when the present Administration came into power.30
2 234 U. S. 342, 34 Sup. Ct. 833 (1913). "Id. at 354.28To the same effect see Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commis-
sion, 245 U. S. 493, 38 Sup. Ct. 170 (1917); Wisconsin Railroad Commission v.
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R., 257 U. S. 563 (1921); New York v. United
States, 257 U. S. 591,42 Sup. Ct. 234 (1921).
29A suggestive article developing thispoint is Stem, That Commercewhich Con-
cerns More States than One (1934) 47 HARV. L. Rav. 1335.
30"From an average of I19 for the year 1929 (2923 to 1925-1oo) industrial
production dropped to 63 in February 1933. (U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of
Foreign and Domestic Commerce, WORLD EcoNomxc REviEw, p. 84, from the
Federal Reserve Board). Commodity prices fell from 95.3 (1926-Ioo) to 59.8 in
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Because of the existence of an interstate market, the idea that pur-
chase and sale are elements thereof was used to sustain comprehensive
local regulation of the Chicago Grain Exchange under the commerce
clause. The court said,
"The question of price dominates trade between the states.
Sales of an article which affect the country wide price of the
article directly affect the country wide commerce in it.""
The authority of Congress to regulate purely intrastate activities
which burden and affect interstate commerce by exerting an adverse
influence on the prices of commodities which move in interstate com-
merce is strikingly illustrated in the cases arising under the Anti Trust
Laws. In United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Company" the Su-
preme Court was concerned with the effect of purely local activities of
striking coal miners upon interstate commerce. Having conceded that
February 1933. Id., p. 92 (Bureau of Labor Statistics). The number of persons
employed in factories fell from IOI in 1929 (1923 to 1925-100) to 59.4 in February
1933. Id., p. ioi (Federal Reserve Board). The total number of persons unem-
ployed is estimated to have been 14,000,000 in 1932. (SEN. Doc. 124 73d CONG. 2d
Sess., Report on National Income, 1929 to 1932). The total payrolls dropped even
further than the total number of persons employed-from 107 in 1929 (1923 to
1925-100) to 4o in February 1933. (WORLD ECONOMIC REVIEW, p. 102). The
average weekly earnings of factory employees in 25 selected industries fell from
$28.54 in 1929 to $16.13 by February 1933. Id., 107 (National Industrial Con-
ference Board). Construction was reduced from 117 for 1929 to 19 in February
1933, and less in the succeeding months. Id., 112 (Federal Reserve Board). The
effect of the depression on national income and on wages received was staggering.
The national income fell from $81,i36,ooo,ooo in 1929 to $48,894,o00,ooo in 1932
(6o.3% of the 1929 total), and total wages received in mining, manufacturing,
construction, and transportation industries fell from $17,179,ooo,ooo in 1929 to
$6,840,000,000 in 1932 (39.8% of the 1929 total). (SEN. Doc. 124, 73d CONG., 2d
Sess., Report on National Income, 1929 to 1932).
"Freight car loadings-which are probably the most accurate basis of inter-
state moVements, although they include intrastate shipments as well-fell from
I06 (1923 to 1925-100) for 1929 to 54 in February 1933. WORLD ECONOMIc RE-
VIEW, 117 (Federal Reserve Board). The actual decrease was from 3,766,ooo cars
in February 1929 to I,971,OOb in February 1933. Id., ii 5 (American Railway
Association)."
3'Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. I, 40 (1923). The court (at p. 36)
analyzed the issue as follows: "The question is whether the conduct of such sales
is subject to constantly recurring abuses which are a burden and obstruction to
interstate commerce in grain. And further are they such an incident to that
commerce and so intermingled with that commerce, that the burden and obstruc-
tion caused therein by them can be said to be direct?" See also Tagg Bros. v.
United States, 280 U. S. 4 20, 5o Sup. Ct. r85 (1929); United States v. Patton, 226
U. S. 525, 33 Sup. Ct. 141 (1912); United States v. Thornton, 271 U. S. 414, 46
Sup. Ct. 586 (1925).
"259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 570 (1922).
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"coal mining is not interstate commerce, and (that) the power of Con-
gress does not extend to its regulation as such", 3 the court after citing
many cases;s said,
"It is clear from these cases that if Congress deems certain re-
curing practices, though not really part of interstate commerce,
likely to obstruct, restrain or burden it, it has the power to sub-ject them to national supervision and restraint".
In Local r67, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States,5 the court said,
"But we need not decide when interstate commerce ends and
that which is intrastate begins. The control of the handling, the
sales and the prices at the place of origin before the interstate journey
begins or in the State of destination where the interstate move-
ment ends may operate directly to restrain and monopolize inter-
state commerce. United States v. Brims, 272 U. S. 549, Coronado
Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295, 30. United
States v. Swift & Co., 122 Fed. 529, 532-533. Cf. Swift & Co. v.
United States, I96 U. S. 375, 398. The Sherman Act denounces
every conspiracy in restraint of trade including those that are to be
carried on by acts constituting intrastate transactions. * * *"
In Standard Oil Company v. United States6 the Supreme Court held
the Anti Trust Act applicable to the defendants, although the conduct
in question related only to the manufacture of gasoline. The court 37
said,
"Moreover, while manufacture is not interstate commerce, agree-
ments concerning it which tend to limit the supply or to fix the
price of goods entering into interstate commerce, or which have been
executed for that purpose, are within the prohibition of the Act."
In United States v. Ferger8 the question at issue was the validity of
an Act of Congress punishing the issuance and the utterance of a
fictitious bill of lading. It was argued that as there was and could be no
33M. at 408.
34Id. at 408; cases cited were Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 25
Sup. Ct. 276 (19o5); United States v. Patton, 226 U. S. 527, 33 Sup. Ct. 141
(1912); United States v. Ferger, 250 U. S. 199, 39 Sup. Ct. 445 (1918); Railroad
Commission v. Chicago, B. Q. R. R., 237 U. S. 220, 35 Sup. Ct. 56o (1914) and
Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 42 Sup. Ct. 397 (1921). See also (The Second
Coronado Case). Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295, 45
Sup. Ct. 551 (1924) where the court said, "But when the intent of those unlaw-
fully preventing the manufacture or production is shown to be to restrain or con-
trol the supply entering and moving in interstate commerce, or the price of it in
interstate markets, their action is a direct violation of the Anti-Trust Acts."
n 2 9 1 U. S. 293, 54 Sup. Ct. 396 (1933).
11283 U. S. 163, 51 Sup. Ct. 421 (1930).
37Id. at 164. 38250 U. S. 199, 203, 205 (1919).
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commerce in a fraudulent and fictitious bill of lading, for the reason
that there was no actual consignee and no shipment intended, that
therefore the power of Congress could not embrace such pretended
bill. The court said,
"But this mistakenly assumes that the power of Congress is to
be necessarily tested by the intrinsic existence of commerce in the
particular subject dealt with, instead of by relation of that sub-
ject to commerce and its effect upon it... Nor is the situation
helped by saying that as the manufacture and use of the spurious
interstate commerce bills of lading were local, therefore the power
to deal with them was exclusively local, since the proposition dis-
regards the fact that the spurious bills were in the form of inter-
state commerce bills, which, in and of themselves, involved the
potentiality of fraud as far-reaching and all-embracing as the flow
of the channels of interstate commerce in which it was contem-
plated the fraudulent bills would circulate."
Since the depression seriously obstructs the flow of commodities in
interstate commerce, it follows that measures reasonably calculated
to free business from the burdens of the depression are regulations
which will protect and foster interstate commerce. It should be re-
membered that long before the present depression the Supreme Court
recognized that under the commerce clause, Congress is empowered
to enact "all appropriate legislation" for its "protection and advance-
ment" 39 to adopt measures "to promote its growth and insure its
safety" 40 and "to foster, protect, control and restrain" 41 it.
7. The "current of commerce" doctrine.
The principle of the Swift4 case has a new significance under pres-
ent emergency conditions, in expanding the commerce clause. In that
case the court declared that "commerce among the states is not a
technical legal conception, but a practical one drawn from the course
of business... The plan may make the parts unlawful" and bring the
constituent acts, although not in themselves interstate commerce,
within the commerce clause. In 1922, Chief justice Taft characterized
the Swift case
"as a milestone in the interpretation of the commerce clause of
the Constitution. It recognized the great changes and develop-
ment in the business of this vast country, and drew again the
39The Daniel Ball, IO Wall. 557, 564, I9 L. ed. 999, iooi (1871).
40Mobile County Bank v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 696,697,26 L. ed. 238,239 (188I).
41Second Employers Liability Cases, 223 U. S. I, 47,32 Sup. Ct. x69, 174 (1912).
"Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 25 Sup. Ct. 276 (I9O5). At 399,
J. Holmes developed the conception of the "Current of Commerce." In Stafford v.
Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 516, 42 Sup. Ct. 397, 402 (1921), the court declared, "The
stockyards are but the throat through which the current pours . .. The stock-
yards and sales are necessary factors in the middle of this current."
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dividing line between interstate and intrastate commerce where
the Constitution intended it to be. It refused to permit local inci-
dents of great interstate movement, which taken alone were in-
trastate, to characterize the movement as such. The Swift case
merely fitted the commerce clause to the real and practical es-
sence of modem business growth.1
4
This "current" oA stream of commerce" doctrine looks to the sub-
ject of the regulation as a whole, and not to the individual transgressor's
separate acts.44 In Stafford v. Wallace45 the court said of the Swift case,
"It was the inevitable recognition of the great central fact that
such streams of commerce from one part of the country to an-
other which are ever flowing are in their very essence the com-
merce among the states and with foreign nations which histori-
cally itwas one of the chief purposes of the Constitution to bring
under national protection and control. This court declined to de-
feat this purpose in respect to such a stream and take it out of
complete national regulation by a nice and technical inquiry into
the non-interstate character of some of its necessary incidents
and facilitates when considered alone and without reference to
their association with the movement of which they were an es-
sential but subordinate part."
8. The acceptance of the Swift Doctrine does not ipso facto destroy state
police power.
It is well established that
"Congress is not to be denied the exercise of its constitutional
power over interstate commerce and its power to adopt not only
means necessary but convenient to its exercise merely because
these means have the quality of police regulations".4
In the Swift case the court said,
"But we do not mean to imply that the rule which marks the
point at which state taxation or regulation become permissible
necessarily is beyond the scope of interference by Congress in
cases where such interference is deemed necessary for the protec-
tion of commerce among the states". 47
There are many transactions that may be subject both to state and
federal regulations. Thus intrastate railroad rates may be regulated by
the states s but when intrastate rates affect interstate commerce,
Congress may regulate them.4 9 Sales of grain on grain exchanges are
43Board of Trade of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U.S. , 35,43 Sup. Ct. 470 (1922).
44The Declaration of Policy of the Agricultural Adjustment Act specifically
recognizes the "Current of Commerce" doctrine.
4258 U. S. 495, 518-519, 521, 15 Sup. Ct. 900 (1921).
46Seven cases of Eckman's alternative v. United States, 239 U. S. 51o, 515
(186). 47196 U. S. 375, 400, 49 L. ed. 518, 526 (19o5).
48Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 57 L. ed. 1511 (1913).
4The Shreveport Case, 234 U. S. 342 (914); Railroad Commission of Wiscon-
sin v. Chicago, B. & Q. Railroad, 257 U. S. 563, 66 L. ed. 371 (1922).
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intrastate sales. The states may both regulate such sales50 and tax the
grain which is the subject of sale;" and yet detailed regulation by Con-
gress of all transactions on the grain exchange has been upheld.5 2
Similarly a state may tax cattle in the stockyards ;53 yet Congress may,
at the same time, regulate the stockyards and the sales of cattle there-
in.5 And states may tax mining, which is not interstate commerce;65
while Federal legislation may also apply to mining where interstate
commerce is burdened.56 The states may still exercise their police pow-
er over intrastate acts which have an interstate effect so long as their
regulations are not inconsistent with those of the Federal government
or contrary to the commerce clause. In this connection the statement
by Justice Holmes is important:
"It being once admitted, as of course it must be, that not every
law that affects commerce among the states is a regulation of it in
a constitutional sense, nice distinctions are to be expected. Reg-
ulation and commerce among the states both are practical
rather than technical conceptions, and, naturally, their limits
must be fixed by practical lines." 57
9. The case of Hammer v. Dagenharts distinguished.
In the Dagenhart case, the Supreme Court by a five to four decision,
looked behind an act of Congress prohibiting interstate commerce in
the products of child labor and held that the real purpose and effect of
the act was "to regulate the hours of labor of children in factories and
mines within the states, a purely state authority". Under a proper
doctrine of stare decisis and in the light of the decisions discussed
above the Dagenhart case is today "elbowed into rather narrow
quarters".5 9 The doctrine of that case is inapplicable to New Deal
legislation for the following reasons: (A) The primary and ultimate
purpose of the N.I.R.A. was not the regulation of labor; it was the
promotion of interstate commerce through the economic rehabilita-
tion of the business of the nation. This purpose is not left to implica-
5°Dixon v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 288 U. S. 188, 198,77 L. ed. 691, 697 (1933).
5"Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U. S. 504, 57 L. ed. 615 (1913).
52Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. I, 67 L. ed. 839 (1923).
53Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U. S. I, 78 L. ed. 131 (1933).
r"Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 66 L. ed. 735 (1922); Tagg Bros. & More-
head v. United States, 28o U. S. 42o, 74 L. ed. 524 (1930).
5Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172, 67 L. ed. 929 (1923); Heisler v.
Thomas Colliery Co., 26o U. S. 245, 67 L. ed. 237 (1922).
"Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295 (1925).
67Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio R. R. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217,
225, 52 L. ed. io31, 1O36 (I9O8). 58247 U. S. 251, 62 L. ed. i1OI (t918).
"Corwin, Congress's Power to Prohibit Commerce (1933) 18 CORNELL LAW
QUARTERLY 477,503.
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tion or conjecture; it is expressly stated in the Declaration of Policy
in Title r of the Act. The history of the New Deal will not permit the
inference that the statute and the regulations thereunder were but a
subterfuge under the guise of which, Congress and the administrative
officers were carrying out some ulterior purpose of their own which
purpose had nothing to do with interstate commerce. In the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act, the quota and allotment principle'has a real
and logical relation to interstate commerce. Its purpose is to prevent
ruinous surpluses, which surpluses have depressed the prices of agri-
cultural products and caused a disparity between the returns which
farmers get for their products and the prices which they must pay for
industrial products. This disparity in turn has broken down and made
impossible an orderly exchange of commodities and has burdened
"the normal currents of commerce". The statute recognizes that the
amount of interstate commerce has fallen to an alarmingly low level
and it declares that it is the purpose of Congress by enacting this
legislation to increase the national interstate commerce for the benefit
of the whole Nation as well as the farmer. Restrictions of agricultural
production was compelled only because low prices to farmers and
overproduction were stopping the flow of interstate and foreign com-
merce. The statutory provisions are directed to the single purpose of
removing those obstructions. On the contrary, the whole history of the
statute held invalid in the Dagenhart case demonstrates that the princi-
pal purpose was to aim at a social evil existing in the various states."
"Nowhere in the opinions or in the argument of counsel (in the
Dagenhart case) is it suggested that the employment of child
labor by the factories has any substantial effect upon interstate
commerce in the articles so manufactured * * * There is no sugges-
tion here that [this] unfair competition [resulting from the em-
ployment of child labor in some States] burdened, obstructed, or
diminished the free flow of interstate commerce in goods of the
character involved. Counsel for the Government, after enumerat-
ing the economic and social reasons in support of the law, sum-
med up their contention by the conclusion that the shipment in
interstate commerce of the goods made with the aid of child labor
operated to deter other states from enacting laws they would
otherwise enact for the protection of their own children; but
counsel did not suggest that the admission to interstate com-
merce of articles made with the aid of child labor would affect
interstate commerce in any degree".6'
(B) The very existence of the depression has rendered the national
business structure more sensitive to conditions in the various states,
"
0See (i933) 47 HARv. L. REv. 84, 89.
6 Victor v. Ickes, (1933, Sup. Ct., D. C.) 61 Wash. L. Rep. 87o, 875.
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so that interstate commerce is affected more directly by local condi-
tions than when the Child Labor Act was passed. 2 When the basis of a
constitutional decision is factual, the court should feel free to revise
its position as conditions change or experience sheds new light on
them. 3 Today it requires no fiction to establish the close causal con-
nection between interstate commerce and manufacturing and agri-
cultural conditions.
io. The Ravdolph Resolution and the Comwerce Power.
Many critics of the New Deal are unaware of the existence or the
significance of the Randolph Resolution, twice adopted by the Con-
stitutional Convention4 as expressing the consensus of opinion of the
framers as to the proper division of power between the states and the
nation.65 The Randolph Resolution read:
"Resolved, that the National Legislature ought to possess the
legislative rights vested in Congress by the Confederation; and
moreover to legislate in all cases for the general interest of the
Union, and also in those (situations) wherein the states are
separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United
States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legisla-
tion."
This Resolution, twice endorsed by the Convention, constituted a
statement of guiding principles. It was sent to the "Committee of
62See Government's brief in Sley System's Garage v. United States, at p. 42-45,
October Term (1934 C. C. A., 3d Circuit) prepared by Henry Edgerton, Special
Assistant to the Attorney-General.
63(1924) 38 HARv. L. REv. 6; (I933) 47 HARV. L. Rnv. 84, 89; in Chasselton
Corporation v. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543, 44 Sup. Ct. 405 (1924) the court said, "A
law depending upon the existence of an emergency or other certain state of facts
to uphold it may cease to operate if the emergency ceases or the facts change even
though valid when passed." On December 3, 1934, the Supreme Court recognized
the significance of the factual background in the case of Borden's Farm Products
Co. v. Baldwin, (1934) 2 U. S. L. WEEK. No. 14; Index p. 283, in these words,
"with the notable expansion of the scope of governmental regulation, and the
consequent assertion of violation of constitutional rights, it is increasingly im-
portant that when it becomes necessary for the court to deal with the facts
relating to particular commercial or industrial conditions, they should be pre-
sented concretely with appropriate determinations upon evidence, so that conclu-
sions shall not be reached without adequate factual support."
"The Resolution was adopted on May 31, 1787 by a vote of 9 states in favor,
i divided, and none against. On July 17, 1787 the Resolution, with slight modifica-
tion was again accepted, this time by a vote of 8 states to 2. (Madison's Debates in
the Federal Convention, as reported in H. R. Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong. First Sess.
(2927) p. 117, 388, 466, entitled "Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the
Union of American States."
"The reader is referred to the admirable article by Stern, That Commerce Which
Concerns More States Than One (1934) 47 HARV. L. REV. 1335 for a detailed dis-
cussion of the Randolph Resolution.
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Detail" to transform the broad language of the Resolution into an
enumeration of Congressional powers, among these the commerce
clause. The Committee of Detail had no authority to change the sub-
stance or content of the reported document. The commerceclause was
the only cleajr power granted to Congress to regulate trad e or busi-
ness. The Convention accepted the formulation of the commerce
clause by the Committee of Detail without debate and the fair infer-
ence is that the framers believed that this power was based upon thd
general proposition that the federal government was "to legislate in
all cases for the general interests of the Union ... and in those to which
the states are separately incompetent." Further in view of the fact
that the need for centralized commercial regulation was recognized as
one of the chief reasons for preparing a new Constitution, it is un-
likely that the Convention intended the commerce clause to have a
narrow or restricted meaning." The government's position in regard
to the Randolph Resolution should not be confused with the conten-
tion rejected by the Supreme Court67 that independently of the enu-
merated powers Congress has power to act for the national well-being
when the several states are impotent. Rather it is our contention that
the power to control "commerce among the several states" should be
construed to include the regulation of commercial matters involving
the nation as a whole, because that was the purpose of the framers. No
hiatus was contemplated. In the present crisis, Congress under the
commerce clause should have ample power to combat the play of
destructive economic forces, 8 that "have broken down the orderly ex-
change of commodities" 69 or have affected, burdened or obstructed
the "normal currents of commerce".
OMadison's notes on the Constitutional Convention were not published until
after his death in 1836 and it is fair to assume that John Marshall did not know
of the vote of endorsement of the Randolph Resolution. However in the first case
involved in the commerce clause, Marshall did formulate a plenary conception
of the commerce clause. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 9Wheat. I, 197, 6 L. ed. 23 (1824)
he said, "If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though
limited to speified objects is plenary, the power over commerce . . . is vested in
Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government."
6Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 27 Sup. Ct. 655 (1907); for a detailed dis-
cussion of various extra-constitutional theories of construction, that are clearly
distinguishable from our present contention see the author's, The United States
War Power aftd Limited Government (1928) z6 Ky. L. J. io8.
"
8We have intentionally omitted any consideration of the doctrine that the
power to "regulate" includes the power to "prohibit". This problem is discussed
in the excellent article Corwin, A Crucial Constitutional Problem-Congress's Power
to Prohibit under the Commerce Clause (1933) I8 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 477.6tMhe language of the Declaration of Emergency of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act.
